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Abstract
Twenty years after Austria joining the EU, this contribution investigates how Austrian diplomacy has been adjusting to the 
changing European demands and opportunities next to global and domestic pressures for adaptation.
Austrian diplomatic adaptation has predominantly been reactive. EU membership and EU sanctions pushed Austrian diplo-
mats to re-adjust their role conceptions. On a more structural level, Austrian diplomacy followed global trends, while dome-
stic budget cuts and lack of  strategic reorientation acted as constrains. Also the introduction of  the European External Action 
Service triggered a rather reactive response to top down Europeanization: the increased European diplomatic coordination 
attempts since 2009 are considered additional tools rather than a substitute for Austrian diplomacy.
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Österreichische Diplomatie im Kontext eines veränderten globalen und  
Europäischen Umfeldes: zwischen Innovation, Adaptierung und Widerstand
Zusammenfassung
20 Jahre nach Österreichs EU-Beitritt untersucht dieser Beitrag die Europäisierung österreichischer Diplomatie in ihrer 
Wechselwirkung mit globalen Trends und nationalen Herausforderungen. Dieser Beitrag beurteilt die Anpassung österrei-
chischer Diplomatie im globalen, europäischen und nationalen Kontext über Zeit.
Der Wandel österreichischer Diplomatie ist vorwiegend als reaktiv zu klassifizieren. Diplomaten haben ihr Rollenverständ-
nis im Zuge von EU Mitgliedschaft und EU Sanktionen angepasst, während auf  struktureller Ebene die österreichische Di-
plomatie globalen Trends folgt. Diese Neuorientierungen sind allerdings stark beschränkt durch andauernd nationale Bud-
getkürzungen und den Mangel einer strategischen Neuausrichtung. Auch die Einführung des Europäischen Auswärtigen 
Dienstes wurde als top-down Europäisierung akzeptiert: die verstärkt europäischen diplomatischen Koordinierungsversu-
che seit 2009 werden als zusätzliches Instrument aber nicht als Ersatz für österreichische Diplomatie bewertet.
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1.  Introduction
EU membership impacted on Austrian foreign policy. Pro-
cesses of  bottom-up and top-down Europeanisation have 
been well documented in the academic literature (Wong 
2011; Alecu de Fleurs/Müller 2012), and the contributions 
to this special issue provide valuable insight in how those 
mechanisms have played out over time in Austrian de-
velopment policy (Obvrovsky/Lightfoot in this special is-
sue) and in Austrian membership to regional cooperation 
(Mueller in this special issue). How Europeanization mech-
anisms have led to adjustments in Austrian diplomacy, 
however, has not been subject to comprehensive academic 
assessment (as empirical exception see Sonnleitner 2015; 
for more general assessment of  member states reaction to 
European External Action Service see Balfour/Raik 2013).  
This contribution discusses how Austrian diplomacy as 
an instrument of  its foreign policy has adapted to changing 
global, European and domestic contexts. In light of  the 20th 
anniversary of  Austrian accession to the European Union, 
the article puts special emphasis on two particular mo-
ments: the impact of  EU membership in the last 1990s, and 
secondly the impact of  the establishment of  the European 
External Action Service and its delegation network with 
the Lisbon Treaty since 2009.  The impact of  EU accession 
on Austrian foreign policy has been well documented in the 
literature, and the observations of  these contributions also 
hold true when zooming in on Austrian diplomacy: Austri-
an diplomats had to get used to the different working mode 
in the EU negotiating system, while it was the sanctions 
in 1999 that led to an adapted role definition by Austrian 
diplomats. It was, however, only in 2009 with the Lisbon 
Treaty that there was a purposeful attempt to reinvigorate 
the diplomatic toolset of  the European Union and its mem-
ber states (Vanhoonacker/Pomorska 2013; Spence/Batora 
2015). It is the impact on Austrian diplomacy of  those more 
current attempts that this paper looks at.
The paper takes the conceptual elaborations of  top-
down and bottom-up Europeanization from the introduc-
tion to this special issue as a starting point, and puts them 
into the context of  wider global pressures and national de-
mands for diplomatic adaptation. Such a widening of  the 
scope proved to be empirically necessary, as not all adjust-
ments in the diplomatic area resulted from the European 
context. The latter must thus not be mistaken for Euro-
peanisation processes of  down-loading or cross-loading. 
Rather global trends strongly interrelated with European 
attempts for innovating diplomacy. At the same time, the 
domestic context of  budget cuts and lack of  strategic reori-
entation impeded the Austrian adjustment to the changing 
global and European context. 
Existing literature on Austrian foreign policy (Höll 
2002; Kramer 2013a; Kramer 2013b; Kramer/Matzner 
2013; Alecu de Fleurs 2012; Sonnleitner 2015) provides 
useful empirical insights as starting point to assess the 
changes in Austrian diplomacy. This contribution 
adds to the existing literature its particular focus on 
diplomacy as a tool of  foreign policy making. It con-
ceptually distinguishes change of  diplomacy in terms 
of  content and in terms of  institutional set-up, and 
in line with the overall theme of  the special issue, it 
links the Austrian experience to Europeanisation of  
small states. Methodologically, the analysis draws 
on an extensive literature review and makes use of  
data gathered through primary sources (for example 
annual Austrian foreign policy reports) and through 
seven qualitative interviews with Austrian diplomats 
in Vienna and Brussels in September/December 2014 
and May 2015. In addition, conversations with four 
academic experts helped the selection of  empirical 
sources and the manner on how to interpret the gath-
ered material. 
This contribution looks at changing global, EU-
level and domestic demands and contexts for Aus-
trian diplomacy and the way it has adjusted to these 
stimuli and pressures. Overall, there was no orches-
trated attempt to qualitatively restructure Austrian 
diplomacy over the past few years. However, in line 
with global trends, Austrian diplomacy also increas-
ingly focuses on trade promotion and service for 
citizens, while Austria also participates in smaller 
attempts for European diplomatic cooperation. In 
terms of  the quality of  change, the article shows that 
Austrian diplomacy is rather adjusting and adapting 
to pressures steaming from the global and European 
level instead of  taking an active leadership role. How-
ever, continuing domestic budget cuts and a lack of  
perceived political will and strategic vision constrain 
the possibilities of  Austrian diplomacy to fulfil the 
still global outlook of  Austrian foreign policy.
2. Conceptualising Europeanisation and change 
of Austrian diplomacy
Diplomacy is still predominantly perceived as a pre-
rogative of  the state, despite increased non-state 
network activities, new actors and globalisation pro-
cesses. It is considered an “essentially political activity” 
in order to pursue “objectives of foreign policies without 
resort to force, propaganda, or law [. . , which…] consists of 
communication between officials [and includes] such discrete 
activities as gathering information, clarifying intentions, 
engendering goodwill” (Berridge 2010, 1). Next to its es-
sential role in bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
(Nowotny 2011, 12-15), diplomacy is considered a 
long-term process in order to establish the notion of  
a close relationship and a common structure for com-
munication between diplomats and different levels of  
the host country. Diplomacy is not only about single 
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actions or reactions at a specific point in time, but about 
the process of  creating a good working relationship and 
personal contacts.
The introduction of  this special issue conceptualises 
Europeanisation as a process that unfolds through time, 
which shapes organisational structures, policy process 
and substance either in a top-down or bottom-up man-
ner (see for example Wong 2011). Whereas Europeanisa-
tion research acknowledges the need to understand the 
comprehensive interaction of  various factors such as 
identities, institutional structures, norms, and chang-
ing interests, Europeanization studies often focus on the 
more narrow distinction between the Europeanisation 
of  foreign policy structures (organisation, routines or 
procedures) and of  foreign policy substance (priorities 
or objectives). 
This distinction of  Europeanisation in terms of  
structures/institutions and substance/objectives is also 
used in this contribution to structure the empirical anal-
ysis according to change of  diplomacy in terms of  sub-
stantive adjustment (content and priorities) and struc-
tural adjustment (procedures and institutional set-up) 
(see first column of  table 1). 
Substantive change of  diplomacy takes place when the 
foreign policy objectives ask for a different aim and con-
tent of  diplomatic action. By contrast, structural change 
relates to reforming the available tool-sets as well as the 
resources and the procedures to apply those tools. The 
latter can include, for example, the adaptation of   the 
diplomatic network, the re-positioning of  embassies 
vis-a-vis the foreign ministry, or increasing or decreas-
ing the quantity and quality of  financial and human 
resources. Both strands are of  course strongly interre-
lated, if  we assume that diplomacy follows a strategic 
outset and planning. But for analytical clarity they will 
be considered separately.  
In addition, change of  diplomacy can take up differ-
ent modes. It can be passive and unregulated, in a sense 
that diplomacy is reacting to global developments with-
out political actors actively promoting such a direction. 
This would resemble a bottom-up approach of  actors on 
the ground integrating new trends in their daily prac-
tice, while those changes are not orchestrated actively 
by the center, i.e. managed by the foreign ministry. On 
the other hand, political actors can deliberately decide to 
innovate diplomacy in order to upgrade the diplomatic 
instruments or to fine-tune diplomatic practice with 
government priorities. Within the latter, change can 
be forward-looking, reactive, or opposing. Innovation is 
deliberative and forward-looking, in that it attempts to 
assess demands and obstacles of  future developments 
and aligns the diplomatic instruments at one´s disposal 
to these assumed scenarios. Change in diplomacy might 
be more reactive but still deliberate, in that it takes the 
form of  adaptation to experienced domestic and external 
pressures. Last, involved actors might deliberately try to 
reject perceived pressures and show resilience to change. 
Next to this conceptualisation of  types and modes of  
changes in Austrian diplomacy, this paper distinguish-
es between global, European and domestic drivers for 
change. At the global level, the status, role and tasks of  
diplomacy have been in flux, while at the domestic level 
Austrian diplomacy is challenged with continuing finan-
cial cuts and the need for changing role conceptions. In 
addition, the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in 2009 
altered and increased European diplomatic cooperation 
on EU level. It is important to point out that my concep-
tual framework does not seek to systematically integrate 
global and domestic drivers of  change into the Europe-
anization framework, but rather presents them as other 
important drivers that are considered as alternative ex-
planations. Table 1 provides an overview of  the various 
dimensions and indicators of  adjustment in diplomacy 








- global priorities,  
 challenges
- to EU priorities and  
 objectives
- to new/altered  




- to new global structures  
 and processes 
- to new EU resources,  
 structures and  
 processes 
- to domestic resources  
 structure and processes  
 (e.g. budgetary cuts,  
 public service reforms  
 etc.)
Table 1: Conceptualisation of change in diplomacy: Levels and indicators
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The levels of  diplomatic change are in the following dis-
cussed in more detail, before the paper looks empirically 
of  how those trends impacted Austrian diplomacy. We 
briefly discuss the assumed impact of  all three levels – 
global, European, domestic – on diplomacy in a struc-
tural and substantive manner. 
2.1 Diplomacy changing in a global context
Diplomacy has been changing for decades, with an in-
creased non-state actor involvement, multilateralisa-
tion, sectoralisation, and the growth of  public diplomacy 
(Duke 2002; Hill/Wallace 1979; Nowotny 2011; for more 
empirical account on technological impact see Kleiner 
2008). It is often superficially assumed that diplomacy 
and diplomats are in decline as a result of  globalization. 
Hocking, however, convincingly shows that we should 
not be too quick to conceptualize those changing pat-
terns as decline (Hocking 2004, 147). Rather we should 
understand those trends as change from hierarchical 
to network modes: there are now more diverse sets of  
actors within more complex international interactions 
(Hocking 2004, 127). There are currently two distinct dy-
namics pulling diplomacy in contradictory directions: 
“privatization” with non-state actors taking over many 
tasks that were considered traditional tasks of  public 
diplomats, and “publicization” with non-governmental 
actors (private and public) becoming more important as 
vis-à-vis of  diplomats (e.g. increasing strategic public 
diplomacy). This dichotomy implies that is not any more 
“top-down, hierarchical models of foreign policy and diplomacy” 
but that those have been transformed into “dynamic tri-
angular pattern of relations between governments, firms and 
NGOs” (Hocking 2004, 149, for discussion on network 
see also Neumann 2012, 172). Diplomats as state repre-
sentatives continue to play a significant role (Hocking 
2004, 127), although their role changes from “gatekeep-
ers” between the domestic and international to “boundary 
spanners [who are …] indispensable in managing increasingly 
complex policy environments through the promotion of commu-
nication and trust” (Hocking 2004, 150-151). 
Despite the recent changes in diplomacy, formal rep-
resentation, information gathering, and communication 
can still be considered as key tasks of  permanent diplo-
macy (Neumann 2012, 19-20). With 24 hour news cycles, 
the internet and information available globally, howev-
er, the production of  knowledge changed for diplomats 
(Bicchi 2014): it is not the sole reporting of  facts, but the 
concise analysis of  linkages and interdependences of  
certain events that shape the diplomat´s task. 
Taking those general considerations into account, 
we would assume that in terms of  substance the task 
of  diplomats in third countries changed towards more 
network-like activities, by promoting the exchange be-
tween Austrian non-state actors and local non-state ac-
tors in economic, cultural and social affairs. In addition, 
with the increased attention for public diplomacy, Aus-
trian diplomats are not only supposed to interact with 
the government of  the host country but also engage with 
the wider political elite and the public. 
2.2 European membership since 1995 and increased 
European diplomatic coordination since 2009
Next to global trends, it is Austrian membership in the 
EU since 1995 and increased European coordination and 
cooperation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) that impacts Austrian foreign policy and Austri-
an diplomacy (see Alecu de Fleurs 2012). In terms of  di-
plomacy, it was the Lisbon Treaty from 2009, which had 
the most profound impact, what is also the reason why 
this paper looks especially at the increased diplomatic 
coordination since 2009. In Brussels, it strengthened 
the role of  the High Representative (HR) who embodies 
now three roles at the same time: the HR is vice-presi-
dent of  the European Commission, coordinates member 
states as chair of  the Foreign Affairs Council, and is the 
head of  the newly established European External Action 
Service (EEAS).
The Lisbon Treaty altered EU diplomatic representa-
tion: it formally upgraded former European Commis-
sion delegations to comprehensive EU delegations and 
made them part of  the European External Action Ser-
vice (EEAS). EU delegations replaced the rotating Coun-
cil presidency in representing the Union abroad and 
coordinating member states on the ground. The latter 
was achieved by institutionalising regular weekly meet-
ings on counsellor level with member states, and with 
weekly/monthly meeting of  Deputy Chief  of  Missions 
and monthly ambassadorial meetings (Maurer/Raik 
2014). The role of  the EU delegation thus transformed 
strongly in the direction of  coordinating and providing 
services for the member states, and to represent the EU 
once there is a common position. 
The Lisbon Treaty tasks the EU delegations thus 
with representing the Union, not just the Community. 
While the vagueness in instructions for EU delegations 
allowed for a variation of  practices on the ground, the 
delegations generally established themselves as hubs in 
the network of  European representation. They provide 
information and minutes to member states´ diplomats, 
and also circulate minutes to member states without 
diplomatic representation in the country (Maurer/Raik 
2014). 
The idea of  establishing a European diplomatic ser-
vice was a reoccurring theme in the constitutional de-
bate after 2000, although member states considerably 
disagreed on the shape and power of  this new EU body 
under the leadership of  a strengthened High Represen-
tative (Morgenstern 2013). The compromise as set in the 
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Lisbon Treaty provides a vague definition: the EEAS is a 
service and not an institution, and the role of  the EEAS 
and its diplomatic network of  EU delegations is still 
subject to various interpretations. While some member 
states strongly reject the idea of  the EEAS taking over 
any diplomatic tasks from the member states, there are 
also others who can consider that in the long term a 
strengthened European cooperation in diplomatic rep-
resentation could lead member states to shift tasks to 
the EU delegations instead of  operating their own dip-
lomatic representations or to find other forms of  syner-
gies in cooperation with other EU member states (EurA-
ctiv 2010). In a first preliminary assessment Balfour and 
Raik (2013) show the variation of  how member states 
react differently to the role of  the EEAS in the first few 
years after the set-up of  this new service in Brussels. 
In light of  Austrian diplomacy, we would assume that 
in terms of  substance Austria aims to use the additional 
information and analysis shared by EU actors. Structur-
ally, it would be logical that Austria as most small and 
medium sized member states (see Balfour/Raik 2013 for 
examples of  other EU member states) actively looks for 
ways of  using synergies with other EU member states 
and the EU delegation. 
2.3 Domestic constraints for diplomatic change 
Pressures for changing diplomacy not only emanate 
from the global and European environment, but the 
domestic context must not be ignored. While national 
foreign ministries are still distinct from sectoral minis-
tries, new public management reforms were also applied 
in some European countries to innovate diplomacy (e.g. 
Netherlands). In addition, budgetary pressures since the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2008 also forced foreign minis-
tries to tighten the belt and look for efficiency savings. 
Considering the pressures emanating from the domestic 
context, it can be assumed that structures and proce-
dures are reviewed for efficiency to save costs. Similarly, 
with limited resources smaller states would substantial-
ly increase their strategic focus on particular regions/
topics and align diplomatic efforts even more closely 
with the top priorities identified by the government. 
After specifying the drivers for change in diplomacy 
on the global, European and domestic level, the next 
part turns empirically to the case of  Austria and inves-
tigates how the assumed pressures and trends feature in 
Austrian diplomacy.
3. A shift in Austrian diplomacy in the past 
 20 years? The empirical evidence
3.1  Austrian diplomacy keeping up with
 global trends
Global trends in diplomacy emphasise increased net-
work activities and public diplomacy efforts. And those 
current global trends leave their marks also on Austrian 
diplomacy (see table 2 for overview): the orientation to-
wards citizens increased - towards own citizens through 
service provision, and towards third country citizens 
through public diplomacy efforts. Procedurally, the tra-
ditional task of  information gathering has been replaced 
by providing concise and timely analysis. In the follow-
ing those trends are investigated in more detail, focusing 
first on change in substance and subsequently on proce-
dural change. 
In terms of  substance, there is an increased attention 
to orientate Austrian diplomatic efforts towards citizens. 
The annual Austrian foreign policy reports increasingly 
highlight the service orientation towards citizens in fa-
cilitating safe travel and assisting in emergency situa-
tions. This is on the one hand due to the attempt of  the 
Table 2: Global trends impacting on the substance and processes of Austria
Substantive 
What: strategic objectives 
Procedural and Structural 
How: mechanisms and tools
Global •  Increased service orientation 
 for citizens 
 (especially in crisis situations)
•  Public diplomacy efforts increased
•  Analysis instead of information gathering; 
 reporting accurate picture outside of 
 “ international cameras”
•  Despite rhetorically increased service orientation 
 and public diplomacy, absolute cut in financial 
 resources for those areas of engagement
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Austria government to provide legitimacy for keeping 
a global diplomatic network (Interview Brussels, May 
2015). On the other hand, the annual Austrian foreign 
policy report (BMEIA 2013, 1) explains this increased 
service orientation through the increased demand for 
service: the more people travel, the more important it is 
that the diplomatic network supports its citizens abroad. 
Thus, the Austrian government installed an electronic 
travel information registration in 2013 (BMEIA 2013, 
301). Additionally, throughout the annual Austrian for-
eign policy reports there is a growing emphasis on crisis 
support. Crisis support teams lead by the Austrian for-
eign ministry, supported by the defence ministry, have 
been strengthened in order to be able to speedily react to 
natural disasters or other emergencies, like for example 
the hostage taking in Yemen in 2013.1 This service orien-
tation has already been emphasised since 2008, when 
the annual report highlights the “increased cooperation 
of  EU member states to exchange information and co-
ordinate” joint evacuation measures  (BMEIA 2008, 101).
This increased orientation towards citizens in Aus-
trian diplomacy extends, however, beyond own nation-
als towards engaging citizens of  third countries. As ob-
served in other diplomatic services, public diplomacy 
and outreach activities increased. It is especially the 
cultural activities in positioning Austria as center for 
the arts, where Austrian diplomats can build on a long-
standing tradition. Bringing Austrian artists to a foreign 
audience and branding those activities as diplomatic 
promotion for Austria fits smoothly into the new de-
mands of  public diplomacy and engaging with a wider 
circle of  recipients than just the host government. The 
aim behind those activities is clearly defined in diplo-
matic objectives: “Austria is meant to be presented as 
modern and innovative-creative country, whose contri-
butions in arts, culture and science are located between 
tradition and innovation” (BMEIA 2013, 271). 
Next to this rhetoric, the increased importance of  
outreach and cultural activities is also reflected in the 
budget allocation for the heading “cultural activities” 
within the foreign ministry when compared over a lon-
ger period of  time: in 1990 only 2.5 million EUR had been 
allocated, while by 1995 this amount had been increased 
to 6.5 million EUR (BMEIA 1995, 324, conversion to EUR by 
author). In 2007 and 2008 more than 7.7 million EUR had 
been allocated for those cultural activities (BMEIA 2007, 
219; BMEIA 2008, 211), representing stable 2% of  the 
overall budget for foreign affairs. However, from 2009 
onward the allocated resources shrunk successively in 
absolute and relative terms: were still 6.78 million EUR 
or 1.6% allocated to cultural activities in 2009 (BMEIA 
2009, 244), the budget shrunk to 5.64 million EUR or 
1 See http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/the-ministry/press/announcements/ 
2013/austrian-hostage-in-yemen-released/ 
1.3% in 2014 (BMEIA 2014, 315). This trend thus clearly 
reflects an increased discrepancy between rhetorical 
aims and financial means when it comes to increased 
orientation towards citizens of  Austrian diplomacy.
Procedurally, Austrian diplomacy also follows the 
global trend for a different kind of  diplomatic knowl-
edge production: a stronger emphasis is put on analysis, 
filtering and interpretation and less on information pro-
viding (Interview Vienna, September 2014). In addition, 
though, it is also still about getting an accurate picture 
about the situation on the ground, especially in situ-
ations that are not shown in international media. Get-
ting the context right is a crucial task of  diplomats when 
sending their analytical reports back to the capital (In-
terview Vienna, September 2014). The Austrian diplo-
mat Thomas Nowotny (2011, 13-14) confirms this obser-
vation. Embassies, for example, are not sole information 
providers about a host country or hold the monopoly of  
inter-state communication anymore. He concludes the 
following:
“The political relevance of  embassies has certainly 
shrunk. Yet, their workload has grown in line with 
the expansion of  trans-border flows of  goods and 
persons. Consulates are even more affected by this 
heavier workload than embassies. Embassies also re-
tain a certain, politically relevant symbolic function 
in affirming the political individuality of  their home 
country” (Nowotny 2011, 14)
Overall, global trends made Austrian diplomacy adapt 
to those altering demands in a reactive manner. Aus-
tria aimed for keeping up with the trend and followed 
the general way of  dealing with those changes, but did 
not show any resilient or innovating reaction. Similar 
changes, either in an active or reactive manner, are how-
ever also observable in other EU member states. The Eu-
ropean dimension with EU membership and increased 
attempts to coordinate European diplomatic efforts 
since 2009 had a more profound impact on Austrian 
diplomacy, as the next chapter will show, although also 
here changes in Austrian diplomacy were triggered in a 
bottom-up manner and showed a more reactive style of  
adaptation.
3.2 The European dimension: Austria as reactive bot-
tom-up adapter 
Two particular events had a considerable impact on Aus-
trian diplomacy: EU accession in 1995, and the EU sanc-
tions against Austria in 1999 (Interview Brussels, May 
2015). In the following, we are first going to discuss those 
events, before turning to the more recent attempts to 
strengthen European cooperation in diplomacy with the 
introduction of  the European External Action Service. 
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In terms of  type of  change, the former had a stronger 
impact on the substance of  Austrian diplomacy, and the 
change often came in a bottom-up manner from Austri-
an diplomats rather from political leadership. The latter 
attempts of  increased European cooperation provided 
impetus for procedural adaptation in a reactive manner 
(for overview see table 3). 
Academic literature (Höll 2002, Alecu de Flers 2012) 
confirms that EU accession had considerable impact on 
Austria and Austrian foreign policy. This also holds true 
for Austrian diplomacy, although two distinctive stages 
can be observed: right after EU accession Austrian dip-
lomats had to get used to the different way of  working 
in EU negotiations what resulted also in a generational 
shift in the Austrian diplomatic service. In addition, the 
increased demand for diplomatic explanation during 
the EU sanctions reshaped the role conception of  a new 
generation of  Austrian diplomats. It was then only with 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 that there were purposive at-
tempts to strengthen European cooperation in diplo-
matic efforts toward third countries outside of  the EU. 
In the first months of  EU membership, Austrian pol-
iticians and diplomats were used to being “neutral” and 
thus take the middle position in any negotiations. In the 
particular setting of  EU negotiations, however, this was 
not possible anymore, when different options needed 
to be considered. The consequence was thus that in its 
first years Austria often went with the majority, what 
did not necessarily work well for reflecting own national 
interests (Interview Brussels, May 2015). This change in 
attitude was crucial, as diplomats and foreign policy of-
ficials considerably had to change their mind-set: being 
neutral does not mean not having an interest. The new 
 
generation of  diplomats seemed more apt to define the 
Austrian position according to interests. 
This evolving more interest-driven mind-set of  
Austrian diplomats was put to the test during the EU 
sanctions against Austria due to the participation of  
the right-wing FPÖ in a coalition government with the 
ÖVP. Suddenly Austrian diplomats had a lot of  explain-
ing to do and to defend their country, even if  the Aus-
trian government formally provided “an interesting 
case of  stigma rejection” (Adler-Nissen 2014, 160-162). 
The subsequent diplomatic sanctions (for more detailed 
elaboration on this case please check Adler-Nissen 2014) 
felt unusual and challenging to Austrian diplomats, 
as since 1955 Austrian diplomats never experienced 
the feeling to have “direct enemies” (Interview Brus-
sels, May 2015). Austrian diplomats had to provide the 
link to the host country, enhance good will, and receive 
goodwill back. Austria branded itself  successfully by 
providing special expertise in certain geographical and 
thematic issues and with hosting international negotia-
tions, especially during the Cold War period. During the 
EU sanctions now suddenly explanations were on order, 
and most Austrian diplomats were caught speechless in 
a situation that was perceived as unusual. But after the 
first shock of  discomfort, there was also an added value 
for the diplomatic service: diplomats increasingly felt 
a purpose in defending Austrian reputation and offer 
explanations. And with this strengthened mind-set in 
place it also became normal to defend Austrian inter-
ests abroad. Again, not all diplomats felt comfortable 
in supporting this change in diplomatic practice, what 
marked another generational turnover in the diplomat-
ic service. 
Table 3: European trends impacting on the substance and processes of Austrian diplomacy




Procedural and Structural 
How: mechanisms and tools
European •  1995: EU accession: interests despite 
 neutral status, 
•  1999: EU sanctions against Austria: 
 defending and representing interests
•  since 1995: a different kind of reporting,
 a different kind of constant negotiating 
 within EU
•  since 2009: Regular meetings of Secretaries 
 General (twice per year) to discuss cooperation 
 possibilities; 
•  co-locations and other attempts to save costs: 
 pragmatism and bottom-up
•  since 2009: COREU and EU delegation network
 as useful extra-information tool
•  Consular cooperation through “integrated 
 political crisis response arrangements”
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Strengthening European diplomatic cooperation 
was a main objective of  the constitutional draft nego-
tiations and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The role of  the 
High Representative was strengthened and fulfilled now 
also the role as Vice-President of  the European Commis-
sion, the chair of  the Foreign Affairs Council, and head 
of  the newly established European External Action Ser-
vice (Vanhoonacker/Pomorska 2013). Outside of  Brus-
sels, the aim was to increase European cooperation in 
diplomatic activities by upgrading former Commission 
delegations to EU delegations, which reinvigorated the 
role previously preformed by Council presidencies to 
coordinate member states diplomats in third countries 
(Maurer/Raik 2014).
Austria like most member states carefully observed 
the set-up of  the European External Action Service, 
whose institutional status has been kept vague in the 
treaty text. Member states were not necessarily nega-
tive towards this innovation, but it was not totally clear 
from the outset how this service would work in practice 
and how it would relate to the diplomatic services of  the 
member states. Only from 2011 onwards the new setting 
became more concrete, as the following account of  Aus-
tria shows. 
In the first few years after the Lisbon Treaty there 
is a vague mentioning of  the EEAS and its delegations 
in the annual Austrian foreign policy report. The 2008 
report (BMEIA 2008, 8-10) explains in detail the ratifi-
cation process of  the Lisbon treaty in Austria and other 
EU member states, while the 2009 one for the first time 
explicitly mentions the EEAS: this service “is going to 
combine the foreign policy tools of the member states and the 
resources of the EU institutions” (BMEIA 2009, 9). The 2010 
edition (BMEIA 2010, 14-15) explains the first steps in 
the Lisbon Treaty implementation and provides a short 
explanation of  how the new service and its delegations 
are going to look like. 
The very detailed elaboration of  over two pages in 
the annual Austrian foreign policy report in 2011 reflects 
the formal adoption of  the Council decision to establish 
the EEAS in December 2010. Next to a concise overview 
of  the structure and set-up of  the EEAS, the 2011 report 
also provides a concise reasoning of  the Austrian sup-
port for the EEAS:
“Austria supports the establishment of the EEAS, because 
the EEAS provides more coherence and stronger vigor to the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to which Aus-
tria is actively contributing. The role and influence of the EU 
as an international actor is thus strengthened in a considera-
ble and sustainable manner. At the same time, Austria is now 
in the position to represent its foreign and security interests 
not only bilaterally, but it can do so also through the EEAS in 
a more efficient and successful manner.” (BMEIA 2011, 37)
In a similar manner, the relationship between the EEAS 
and the diplomatic services is concisely reflected upon 
and shows clear expectations towards the added value of  
this new service: 
“The Lisbon Treaty does not constrain member states com-
petences in the formulation and implementation of their 
foreign policies or of their diplomatic representations in third 
countries or towards international organisations. The tasks 
and functions of the Austrian foreign ministry do therefore 
not change due to the EEAS. The Austrian foreign ministry, 
however, works in close cooperation with the EEAS and thus 
ensures that Austria contributes to the foreign policy action 
of the EU and of the CFSP in particular” (BMEIA 2011, 38; 
translation by author).
The Austrian support for the EEAS and its emphasis that 
the EEAS is an additional tool rather than a substitute 
for Austrian diplomatic action is also reiterated in the 
annual Austrian foreign policy reports of  2012 (BMEIA 
2012, 29) and 2013 (BMEIA 2013, 29-21). In those reports 
Austria furthermore reconfirms that there has not been 
a substantial increase in personnel for the EEAS despite 
their additional roles in coordination and chairing. This 
move is explicitly explained as to ensure that the EEAS 
does not duplicate activities of  EU member states em-
bassies in third countries (BMEIA 2013, 19). 
Staffing is a reoccurring salient aspect for Austrian 
diplomacy but also for the EEAS. In 2014, 320 Mem-
ber states diplomats of  a total of  945 staff (AD officials) 
worked for the EEAS (EEAS 2015, 55-57). In total there 
were 27 Austrians: in the headquarters in Brussels 10 
Austrian are employed as officials, while 3 work as tem-
porary agents. In the delegations there are 7 officials as 
well as 7 temporary agents. 10 of  those 27 Austrians are 
assigned as member states diplomats, while the other 
17 Austrians are employed directly as EEAS staff (EEAS 
2015, 57). From the Austrian diplomatic service, so far 11 
diplomats applied for a temporary assignment with the 
EEAS, whereas disregarding the official affiliation a total 
of  43 Austrians work in the EEAS, among which several 
EU ambassadors (BMEIA 2013, 19). 
Seconded Austrian diplomats so far do not experi-
ence any direct disadvantage in their diplomatic career, 
although expectations need to be managed to avoid dis-
appointment upon return: within the Austrian diplo-
matic service it is difficult to offer the same high ranking 
posts like seconded Austrian diplomats can be assigned 
for in the EEAS (Interview Vienna, September 2014). 
At the onset of  the EEAS there was some general fear 
with member states that “best diplomats will move to 
the EEAS” (EurActiv 2010), and indeed for smaller and 
medium-sized diplomatic services the negative short-
term impact of  sending staff to the EEAS for 3-4 years is 
considered in their choice of  seconding diplomats to the 
H. Maurer: Austrian diplomacy in changing context I OZP Vol. 45, Issue 2 43
EEAS (interview Vienna, September 2014). Since 2009, 
Secretaries General of  EU member states meet twice per 
year with the EEAS in order to discuss future coopera-
tion possibilities and synergies (Interview Vienna, Sep-
tember 2014). 
Next to those procedural aspects directly related to 
the EEAS, increased attempts to coordinate European 
diplomatic action triggered additional procedural im-
pact: the COREU network for extra-information and co-
locations for cost efficiency. In the post-Lisbon Treaty 
situation, the Austrian foreign ministry now also re-
ceives reports through the COREU network from coun-
tries where it has no diplomatic representation. Those 
reports are either issued by the EU delegation or the 
substituting member state and contain regular assess-
ments of  the situation on the ground. It is “a nice added 
aspect” (Interview Vienna, September 2014), although 
the added value for Austrian diplomacy must not be 
overestimated: if  Austria would have an interest in the 
particular country, it would have a diplomatic represen-
tation there. 
The second re-occurring issue on European diplo-
matic coordination during the past two years is the op-
portunity for co-locations and other attempts to create 
synergies (BMEIA 2013, 300). The EEAS aims at sup-
porting member states efforts in this regard through 
creating a platform (Interview EEAS, January 2014), al-
though it is mostly member states who push this debate 
like the German foreign ministry in September 2014 
(interview Vienna, September 2014). In the Austrian 
context, attempts for co-locations are nothing new, as 
already foreign minister Plassnik between 2005-9 ex-
perimented in cooperation with Hungary and Switzer-
land. Co-locations can work well when it is with coun-
tries that have similar security standards, but very often 
it is a pragmatic discussion about locations, venues, and 
technical possibilities, which can vary greatly from third 
country to third country (Interview Vienna, September 
2014). In the public (Euractiv 2010) and expert discourse 
(Austrian Court of  Auditors 2014, 198-199) such forms 
of  European cooperation are often heralded as a great 
future tool to safe costs, but so far a pragmatic and ad-
hoc approach was the rule, and it has to be seen to what 
extent the EEAS and member states exchanges on the EU 
level can support the development of  joint locations. 
The third major topic of  increased European coop-
eration refers to consular cooperation and the establish-
ment of  “integrated political crisis response arrange-
ments”. While the general discussion is still vague, it is 
in crisis situations where member states and also Aus-
tria see potential for increased cooperation. The annual 
Austrian foreign policy report states that “the role of  the 
European External Action Service in terms of  support-
ing member states in their dealings with consular crisis 
relevant activities should be examined more closely” 
(BMEIA 2013, 2). For now, EU member states established 
the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response arrange-
ments (IPCR) in 2013, which is meant to support a quick 
coordination of  member states during disasters, attacks 
or other major emergency situations.2 
EU membership in 1995 and the increased attempts 
for increasing European diplomatic cooperation since 
2009 considerably impacted Austrian diplomacy. In 
terms of  substance, EU accession and especially EU 
sanctions in 1999 changed the mind-set of  Austrian dip-
lomats by moving towards a stronger interest represen-
tation despite neutrality. Procedurally, Austrian diplo-
macy adapted to the EU way of  negotiating and Austria 
generally supported the establishment of  the EEAS as 
an additional tool to represent its interests globally. Both 
strands feature a strong reactive adaptation of  change in 
diplomacy. In the following, we are going to now also 
consider the domestic context, which can of  course not 
be ignored when considering change of  Austrian diplo-
macy.
3.3. The domestic dimension not to be ignored: Aus-
trian diplomacy just as good as Austrian foreign 
policy makers want it to be 
The domestic discourse on Austrian diplomacy during 
the past decade has been predominantly informed by 
governmental budget cuts. Despite fewer resources there 
was no adaptation of  the global outlook in foreign policy 
strategy, and after 2008 the political elite seemed to have 
lost any interest in foreign policy or diplomacy as a tool 
(see contribution by Helmut Kramer in this special issue 
for a more detailed account of  Austrian foreign policy 
and its renationalisation and provincialisation). With 
foreign minister Kurz coming into office in December 
2013 the political attention for foreign affairs has been 
growing again, although messages are mixed, and the 
discrepancy between the global ambitions of  Austrian 
foreign policy and the shortage of  means remains (see 
table 4 for overview). Next to the need for political steer-
ing in setting clear foreign policy objectives (substantive 
dimension), diplomacy as a tool of  foreign policy even 
after technological innovations is still resource intense 
and highly dependent on man-power and financial re-
sources (procedural dimension). 
In terms of  tools and available resources, Austrian 
diplomacy has been considerably constrained by cuts. 
Especially for diplomatic tools, resources and man-
power are still key and directly dependent on available 
financial means. After EU accession the Austrian gov-
ernment focused on achieving the Maastricht criteria 
for the third stage of  the Euro, which was supported by 
2 For details see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-pu-
blications/publications/2014/eu-ipcr/ 
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a generally positive growth of  the Austrian economy. 
However, in 1999, it was the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition that 
introduced budget cuts and structural consolidation 
through savings on expenses as main focus of  govern-
ment reforms3. In 2000, EUR 327 million were allocated 
for external affairs in the Austrian budget (0.56% of  to-
tal federal expenses). This amount decreased to EUR 301 
million and 0.49% in 2003, before increasing steadily 
to EUR 415 million in 2008 (0.52% of  Austrian budget). 
With the exceptions of  2010 and 2011 (EUR 431 and 427 
million respectively), the external affairs budget sank 
again towards EUR 417 million in 2015 (0.48% of  total 
national expenses)4. Although cross-national compari-
sons are difficult due to different allocations of  areas 
under the heading “external spending, it is quite telling 
that Germany, for example, spent 1.14% of  its federal 
budget on foreign affairs in 20145. 
The Austrian diplomatic service had accepted the 
imposed cuts and tried to show that it “can cut costs bet-
ter” (Interview Brussels, May 2015) than other minis-
tries. But because the Austrian diplomatic service had 
started off  with a quite stretched staffing level already, 
those cuts form 2000 onwards led to a “chronic under-
staffing”, especially compared to diplomatic services of  
similarly sized countries. In the Austrian permanent 
representation in Brussels, for example, there are 10 
diplomats working on foreign affairs, while Sweden has 
up to 30 diplomats at their disposal. This understaffing 
and underfinancing thus shows especially in terms of  
available staff.  Kramer/Matzner (2013) show tellingly 
that the already quite thin account of  1600 staff  in 1995 
shrank to 1200 staff  in 2013, while the necessity for in-
ternational presence and the increased consular work 
for traveling citizens grew. At the same time the diplo-
matic network hardly changed during the past 20 years 
(see table 5).
3 See parliamentary discussion on budget report 1999 for more de-
tails: http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2000/PK0279/
index.shtml 
4 Data taken from from Budget act 2012, budget act 2014, and from 
the Austrian budgetary report 2014/2015: https://www.bmf.gv.at/
budget/das-budget/Budgetbericht_2014_2015.pdf?4jwmo9
5 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/020/1802000.pdf  
In order to keep the diplomatic network despite the 
fewer available resources, this meant of  course that 
staff was reduced per posting. Many postings were cut 
down to one diplomat plus one additional staff member, 
what is enough to receive reports from those locations 
but does not leave any resources for additional activities 
(Interview Brussels, May 2015). While the Austrian for-
eign service tried to make ends meet while still achieving 
the same objectives, the Austrian court of  auditors in its 
2014 special report emphasises that “structural changes 
did not follow any strategic planning documentation” 
(Austrian Court of  Auditors 2014, 190).
The Austrian foreign affairs budget already started 
from a very low level in 2000, and even more so it is nec-
essary to note that with Sebastian Kurz taking up the of-
fice as foreign minister in December 2013 the agenda for 
“improvement of  integration” has been moved into the 
foreign ministry and thus also into the budget for for-
eign affairs. The 2015 foreign affairs budget of  EUR 417 
million thus allocates EUR 249 million to operational 
issues, of  which EUR 76 million are for the foreign min-
istry and EUR 173 million for the embassy network. The 
additional EUR 168 million are comprised of  EUR 22 
million for improvement of  integration, EUR 65 million 
for development cooperation, and EUR 80 million for 
contributions to international organisations (Austrian 
Budget Act 2015, 125-131). 
This structural shortcoming in terms of  Austrian 
diplomacy, is also directly linked to the lack of  a clear 
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Substantive 
What: strategic objectives and 
strategy
Procedural and Structural 
How: mechanisms and tools
Domestic Add-ons (FM Kurz): service orientation and 
business support
No strategic reorientation in geographical and 
thematic coverage – cover it all; 
Several phases of budget cuts and “fiscal 
consolidation”: “do the same with less 
resources”
“chronic under-staffing” as norm
Change of Austrian 
diplomacy
Substantive 
What: strategic objectives and strategy
Procedural and Structural 
How: mechanisms and tools
Domestic •  Add-ons (FM Kurz): service orientation  
 and business support 
•  No strategic reorientation in geographical  
 and thematic coverage – cover it all; 
•  Several phases of budget cuts and “fiscal  
 consolidation”: “do the same with less resources”
•  “chronic under-staffing” as norm
Table 4: Domestic issues impacting on the substance and processes of Austrian diplomacy
Table 5: Austrian diplomatic representation 1995 and 
2013 compared (Data taken from BMEIA 1995, 2008 and 
2013)
1995 2008 2013
Bilateral Embassies  80  81  80
Representation at IOs  7  5  5
General Consulates  18  14  8
Independent cultural fora  11  6  6
Different representative body  1  1
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substantive re-focusing of  Austrian diplomacy. The 
problem is that time and again “there were cuts but not 
savings” in the Austrian foreign policy budget (Inter-
view Vienna, September 2014). Cuts imply simply less 
financial means by doing the same, while savings would 
be accompanied by a strategic reconsideration of  long-
term effects. This strategic re-orientation, however, has 
not taken place, and quite on the contrary the Austrian 
foreign and diplomatic service is now meant to cover 
even additional areas and services. The Austrian Budget 
Act 2014 explains the need for increased service for citi-
zens as following:
“The motto ´globally there for you´ reflects the self-
image about expected outputs and the increasing 
expectations of  our citizens. […] The fact that Aus-
trians in a globalised world are getting more mobile 
constantly increases consular work and the necessity 
of  consular presence. Austrians take approx. 10 mil-
lion trips abroad per year; more than 450.000 citizens 
stay abroad for a considerable amount of  time. More 
and more Austrians are subject to crisis or catastrophe 
scenarios abroad” (Austrian Budget Act 2014, 120).
This emphasis on the increased service orientation of  
Austrian diplomacy (also confirmed in BMEIA 2013) 
strongly reflects the publicly announced strategic reori-
entation by current foreign minister Kurz, who next to 
citizens service also pinpointed service for investment 
promotion and additional support for Austrian business 
as additional tasks for Austria diplomacy (Interview Vi-
enna, September 2014). Critical voices though keep em-
phasising that adding those additional tasks does still 
not provide a strategic outlook for Austrian diplomacy. 
Despite EU accession and continuous budget cuts, and 
despite Austria being a small state with limited resourc-
es there is still an attempt to cover everything. The Aus-
trian diplomatic service certainly provides special ex-
pertise in key areas like the Balkans or Eastern Europe, 
but there is no strategic prioritisation (Interview Brus-
sels, May 2015; for similar critical remarks see Kramer 
2013a). Since 2008 observers increasingly lament a “ten-
dency toward ´inward-politicisation´ and ´tabloidiza-
tion´ of  foreign policy decisions” (Kramer 2013b, see 
also Kramer in this special issue). This lack of  political 
steering is not only harming the reputation of  Austrian 
diplomacy, but it also does not fulfil the need for active 
diplomatic efforts due to Austria´s neutral status. 
4. Concluding Remarks
This contribution analysed how Austrian diplomacy 
has adapted to changing global, European and domestic 
conditions since Austrian accession to the EU in 1995. In 
terms of  quality of  change, Austrian diplomacy mostly 
is characterised by reactive adaptation, while especially 
the impact of  EU accession and EU sanctions in 1999 fol-
lowed bottom-up dynamics that were triggered by indi-
vidual diplomats rather than top-down strategic steer-
ing by political decision-makers. 
Austria generally followed the global trend by in-
creased service orientation for citizens and additional 
attention on trade and investment promotion in Aus-
trian diplomacy. On domestic level the drivers of  change 
are quite stable since 2000: repeated budget cuts and 
efficiency measures are at the core of  domestic impact, 
while the diplomatic network has been kept the same 
size. Overall despite this permanent shortage of  re-
sources there has been no strategic reorientation. Quite 
on the contrary the tasks of  Austrian diplomacy have 
been even extended.
In regard of  the European dimension and the fo-
cus of  this special issue, Austria again plays along and 
shows a rather reactive attitude. The Austrian diplomat-
ic service is pleased with the extra information received 
from EU delegations and member states coordination on 
the ground in third countries without overestimating its 
added value. At the same time, they also clearly indicate 
that the EEAS is to be seen as an additional tool for Aus-
trian interest representation rather than a substitute for 
Austrian diplomacy and Austrian foreign policy mak-
ing. In comparison, the socialisation of  Austrian diplo-
mats after EU membership and the change in mind-set 
after the EU sanctions in 1999 had a more long-lasting 
impact on Austrian diplomacy. EU membership had a 
considerable impact on Austrian diplomacy, although 
this paper also showed that diplomatic adjustments can-
not be fully understood without also taking into account 
the do mestic and global contexts.
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